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Abstract— To operate effectively in tomorrow’s smart cities,
autonomous vehicles (AVs) must rely on intra-vehicle sensors
such as camera and radar as well as inter-vehicle communi-
cation. Such dependence on sensors and communication links
exposes AVs to cyber-physical (CP) attacks by adversaries that
seek to take control of the AVs by manipulating their data.
Thus, to ensure safe and optimal AV dynamics control, the
data processing functions at AVs must be robust to such CP
attacks. To this end, in this paper, the state estimation process
for monitoring AV dynamics, in presence of CP attacks, is
analyzed and a novel adversarial deep reinforcement learning
(RL) algorithm is proposed to maximize the robustness of AV
dynamics control to CP attacks. The attacker’s action and the
AV’s reaction to CP attacks are studied in a game-theoretic
framework. In the formulated game, the attacker seeks to inject
faulty data to AV sensor readings so as to manipulate the
inter-vehicle optimal safe spacing and potentially increase the
risk of AV accidents or reduce the vehicle flow on the roads.
Meanwhile, the AV, acting as a defender, seeks to minimize the
deviations of spacing so as to ensure robustness to the attacker’s
actions. Since the AV has no information about the attacker’s
action and due to the infinite possibilities for data value
manipulations, the outcome of the players’ past interactions are
fed to long-short term memory (LSTM) blocks. Each player’s
LSTM block learns the expected spacing deviation resulting
from its own action and feeds it to its RL algorithm. Then, the
the attacker’s RL algorithm chooses the action which maximizes
the spacing deviation, while the AV’s RL algorithm tries to find
the optimal action that minimizes such deviation. Simulation
results show that the proposed adversarial deep RL algorithm
can improve the robustness of the AV dynamics control as it
minimizes the intra-AV spacing deviation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) will encompass
autonomous vehicles (AVs), roadside smart sensors (RSSs),
vehicular communications, and even drones [1]–[3]. To op-
erate in a truly autonomous manner in future ITSs, AVs must
be able to process a large volume of ITS data collected via
a plethora of sensors and communication links. Reliability
of such data is crucial to mitigate the chances of vehicle
collisions and improve the vehicular flow on the roads [4].
However, this reliance on communications and data process-
ing renders AVs highly susceptible to cyber-physical attacks.
In particular, an attacker can possibly interject the AV data
processing stage, reduce the reliability of measurements
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by injecting faulty data, and ultimately induce accidents
or compromise the traffic flow in the ITS [5]. Such flow
disruptions can also cascade to other interdependent critical
infrastructure such as power grids or cellular communication
systems that provide service to the ITSs [6], [7].
Recently, a number of security solutions have been pro-
posed for addressing intra-vehicle security problems [8]–
[11]. In [8], the authors identified the key vulnerabilities of
a vehicle’s controller and proposed a number of intrusion
detection algorithms to secure this controller. Moreover in
[9], the authors show that long-range wireless attacks on
AVs’ current security protocols can disrupt their controller
area network. They analyze the vulnerabilities of AVs’ intra-
vehicle networks to outsider wireless attack. Meanwhile, the
authors in [10] addressed the security challenges of plug-in
electric vehicles, while accounting for their impact on the
power system. Moreover, a survey on security threats and
protection mechanisms in embedded automotive networks is
presented in [11].
Furthermore, vehicular communication security challenges
and solutions have also been studied recently in [12]–
[16]. In [12], the security vulnerabilities of current vehic-
ular communication architecture are analyzed. Moreover,
the computational overhead caused by beacon encryption is
mitigated by using a short term authentication scheme and
a cooperative vehicle computation architecture. The authors
in [13] proposed the use of multi-source filters to reduce the
security vulnerability of a vehicular network, with respect to
data injection attacks. Furthermore, the in [14] introduced a
new framework to improve the trustworthiness of beacons by
combining two physical measurements (angle of arrival and
Doppler effect) from received wireless signals. Moreover, in
[15], the authors proposed a collaborative control strategy
for vehicular platooning to address spoofing and denial of
service attacks. Finally, an overview of current research on
advanced intra-vehicle networks and the smart components
of ITS and their applications is presented in [16].
However, the architecture and solutions in [8]–[16] do not
take into account the interdependence between the cyber
and physical layers of AVs while designing their security
solutions. Moreover, these existing works do not properly
model the attacker’s actions and goals. In this context, the
cyber-physical interdependence of the attacker’s actions and
goals will help providing better security solutions. Moreover,
the prior art in [8]–[16], does not provide solutions that can
enhance the robustness of AV dynamics control to attacks.
Nevertheless, designing an optimal and safe ITS requires
robustness to attacks on intra-vehicle sensors as well as
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inter-vehicle communication. Moreover, existing works on
ITS security often assume a stable state for the attacker’s
action, while in many practical scenarios, the attacker might
adaptively change its strategy to increase the impact of its
attack on the ITS.
The main contribution of this paper is, thus, to propose
a novel adversarial deep reinforcement learning (RL) frame-
work that aims at providing robust AV control. In particular,
we consider a car following model in which we focus on
the control of an AV that closely follows another AV. Such
a model is suitable because it captures the AV’s dynamics
control while taking intro account AV’s sensor readings and
beaconing. We consider four sources of information about the
leading AV gathered from intra-vehicle sensors such as cam-
era, radar, RSSs, and inter-vehicle beaconing. We consider
an attacker which can inject bad data to such information and
tries to increase the risk of accidents or reduce the vehicular
flow. In contrast, the AV’s goal is to optimally control its
speed while staying robust to such data injection attacks from
the attacker. To analyze the interactions between the AV and
the attacker, we pose the problem as a game and analyze its
Nash equilibrium (NE). However, we observe that obtaining
the AV and attacker actions at the NE will be challenging due
to having continuous attacker and AV actions sets as well as
continuous AV speed and spacing. To address this problem,
we propose two deep neural networks (DNNs) based on
long-short term memory (LSTM) blocks for the AV and the
attacker that extract the summary of past AV dynamics and
feed such summaries to an RL algorithm for each player.
On the one hand, the AV’s RL algorithm tries to learn the
best estimation from its leading AV’s speed by combining
the sensor readings. On the other hand, the RL algorithm
for the attacker tries to deceive the AV and deviate the
inter-vehicle optimal safe spacing. Simulation results show
that the proposed deep RL algorithm converges to a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium point and can lead to significant
improvement in the AV’s robustness to data injection attacks.
The results also show that the AV can use the proposed deep
RL algorithm to effectively learn the sensor fusion rule that
minimizes the error in speed estimation thus reducing the
deviations from the optimal safe spacing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model for AV control. Section
III formulates the robust AV control problem in a game-
theoretic framework. Section IV proposes our adversarial
deep learning algorithm. Section V analyzes the simulation
and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a smart road in an ITS consisting of multiple
AVs and RSSs. Each AV i is equipped with a camera
to take images from the environment, a radar to measure
distances from objects in the vicinity of the AV, and a
transceiver device to communicate important position-speed-
acceleration (PVA) beacons with nearby AVs and sensors
over a cellular network. One challenging area in such ITSs
is the optimal and safe flow control of AVs by using the
collected measurements and received beacons. Moreover, the
presence of an adversary might induce faulty decisions to the
ITS and result in accidents or reduce the vehicle flow. Thus,
the AVs’ control on the roads must be robust to faulty data
injected to the measurements and beacons by a malicious
attacker. Next, we present an estimation model at each AV
to observe the speed of its leading AV (i.e., the preceding AV)
using sensor and beacon fusion and we model the adversary
and its available actions. Then, we define a dynamic process
to capture the spacing between the AVs as a function of the
attacker and AV actions.
A. Autonomous Vehicle Cyber-physical System
In order to drive safely and prevent accidents, each AV
i must acquire information about its own position, speed vi
as well as the distance and speed of some nearby objects
such as the immediately leading AV, i − 1. One framework
to analyze the speed of an AV i is by using the so called
car-following models that is popular in the literature [17].
Here, we use the General Motors’ first car-following model
to analyze the speed update at each AV i as a function of
AV i− 1’s speed as follows [17]:
v˙i(t) = λ(vˆi−1(t)− vi(t)), (1)
where λ is a reaction parameter and vˆi−1(t) is the estimated
speed of AV i − 1 at AV i. As we can see from (1), each
vehicle must estimate vˆi−1(t) at each time step in order to
control its dynamics. To this end, each AV must use its own
built-in sensors such as camera, radar as well as periodic
reports from AV i − 1 and the closest RSS. Thus, at each
AV i, AV i − 1’s speed, vi−1(t), must be estimated from
AV i − 1’s measured speed using a camera image, ci, and
radar reading, ri, on AV i, AV i−1’s speed report ui−1, and
closest RSS’s reported speed si. Therefore, the relationship
between AV i − 1’s exact speed and the measurements can
be expressed using a generic linear model as follows:
zi(t) = Hivi−1(t) + ei(t), (2)
where H ∈ R4×1 is the measurement Jacobian matrix, zi ,
[ci, ri, ui−1, si]
T , and ei ∈ R4×1 is a random error vector.
Now, assuming complete information about H and with a
condition that H is full rank, we can estimate di as follows:
HTi zi(t) = H
T
i Hidi(t) +H
T
i ei(t)
⇒
[
HTi Hi
]−1
HTi zi(t) =
[
HTi Hi
]−1
HTi Hidi(t)
+
[
HTi Hi
]−1
HTi ei(t)
⇒ di(t) =
[
HTi Hi
]−1
HTi zi(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
dˆi(t)
−
[
HTi Hi
]−1
HTi ei(t), (3)
where dˆi is the estimated distance. Now, by defining zˆi ,
Hid˜i as the estimated measurement vector, we can find
the measurement estimation error or residual as z˜i , z −
zˆi. Next, we can define a weighted cost function for the
measurement residual as follows:
Ji(z˜i) , z˜Ti W iz˜i = [zi − zˆi]T W i [zi − zˆi] , (4)
where W i is a positive definite square matrix. If the mea-
surements are not dependent, a typical choice for W i is to
have positive diagonal components while the non-diagonal
components are zero. Since in our model the sensor error
are independent, we consider W i to be a diagonal matrix in
which wik on the k-th row and column of W i is the weight of
measurement k. The estimator at each AV i must minimize
the cost function in (4). It can be proven that the solution of
this problem is given by [18]:
v¯i−1(t) =
[
HTi W iHi
]−1
HTi W izi(t). (5)
Since we know that all the sensors can directly measure the
speed, we can consider H = [1, 1, 1, 1]T . Moreover, since
the diagonal entities of W i are weights assigned to each
sensor reading, thus we can consider
∑k
i=1 w
i
k = 1. Now,
(5) can be simplified to:
v¯i−1(t) =
∑4
k=1 w
i
k(t)z
i
k(t)∑4
k=1 w
i
k(t)
=
4∑
k=1
wik(t)z
i
k(t) = w
T
i (t)zi(t),
(6)
where zik(t) is the k-th element of zi(t), and wi(t) is a
vector with wki (t) as its element k.
B. Attack Model
In the studied system, an attacker is able to inject faulty
data to any of the aforementioned sensor readings. Such
attacks can take place using special lasers to alter camera
and radar readings as well as man in the middle attacks to
inject bad data into the input of the AV and RSS beacons. We
define z˜i(t) as an “under attack sensor vector” which can be
defined as z˜i(t) , zi(t) +ai(t), where ai(t) is the injected
faulty data vector at time t to the sensor vector zi(t). Thus,
such attack will induce a deviation in the value of the speed
estimation which can be derived from (6) as follows:
v˜i−1(t) = wTi (t)z˜i(t),
= vi−1(t) +wTi (t)ei(t) +w
T
i (t)ai(t). (7)
Hence, the attacker can change AV i − 1’s estimated speed
at AV i by injecting faulty data. However, to stay stealth, the
attacker cannot inject any arbitrary data due to the physical
limitations of the system. For instance, at each time step
the attacker cannot report a very high or low speed to
AV i. Moreover, due to the difference in the sensor types
(camera image, radar reading, beacons), the attacker cannot
manipulate the sensors equally. Thus, we consider threshold
levels for each sensor k such that |aik(t)| < τ ik where aik(t)
is the data injected to AV i’s sensor k.
III. CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY PROBLEM AND GAME
FORMULATION
From (7), we can see that the AV i’s estimated speed
at each time step is a function of the actual AV i’s speed,
vi−1(t), as well as the noise, ei(t), the weighting wi(t), and
the attack ai(t) vectors. Thus, using (1) we can see that each
AV i’s speed vi(t) is also a function of vi−1(t), ei(t), wi(t),
and ai(t). Here, we analyze the spacing di(t) between AVs
i and i − 1, before we subsequently investigate the optimal
safe spacing for the AVs. It can be shown that the derivative
of di(t) is the difference between the speeds of the AVs, as
follows:
d˙i(t) = vi−1(t)− vi(t,ai(t),wi(t), ei(t)). (8)
Thus, the spacing at each time step is a function of the
AVs’ speed as well as the sensor readings and the attack
vector. Such attack vector can manipulate the spacing di(t)
yielding two effects on the ITS: a) if di(t) decreases, the risk
of collision between AVs increases and b) if di(t) increases,
the traffic flow will reduce, which will be non-optimal and
ineffective for the ITS operation. Therefore, the attacker’s
goal is to manipulate the spacing and deviate it from the
optimal safe state while staying stealthy. In contrast, AV i
tries to optimize its operation while staying robust to such
sensor manipulations to minimize the spacing deviations.
Formally, the attacker’s goal is to find an attack vector a∗i (t)
at each time step t such that:
a∗i (t) = max
ai(t)
Ri(ai(t),wi(t), ei(t)) , (di(t)− oi(vi−1(t)))2,
(9)
s.t. |aik(t)| < τ ik ∀k = 1, . . . , 4 (10)
where Ri(t) is AV i’s regret function which quantifies the
deviation from the optimal safe spacing and oi(vi−1(t)) is the
optimal safe spacing at time t. Conversely, AV i’s objective
is to find a weighting vector w∗i (t) to minimize the defined
regret function as follows:
w∗i (t) = min
wi(t)
Ri(ai(t),wi(t)), (11)
s.t.
4∑
k=1
wik(t) = 1. (12)
The optimization problems in (9) and (11) are dependent on
the actions of both the attacker and the AV. Solving such
problem requires taking into account the interdependence of
AV and the attacker’s actions. In the following we analyze
the interdependence of the attacker and the AV’s actions to
each other and their previous actions and we formulate such
problem in a game-theoretic framework [19].
To this end, we first derive the impact of past attacker
and AV actions on their future actions. Next, we analytically
derive a limit on the number of past regret samples which
are enough to take future actions with T being the sampling
period of the sensors.
Theorem 1. The attacker and the AV can optimally choose
their future actions if: (i) λT < 2 and (ii) they have
information about the regret for at least n¯ past time steps,
where n¯ is the smallest integer that satisfies:
n¯ ≤ log()
log(|1− λT |) , (13)
where  is a small value.
Proof. First, due to discrete-time sensor readings, we convert
the continuous car-following model in (1) to a discrete one
while considering that AV i − 1’s estimated speed is under
attack, as follows:
vi(t+ T )− vi(t)
T
= λ(v˜i−1(t)− vi(t))
⇒ vi(t+ T ) = λT v˜i−1(t) + (1− λT )vi(t). (14)
From (14) we can see that having a stable system requires
|1 − λT | < 1 ⇒ 0 < λT < 2 which always holds true.
Moreover, we can use (14) to find vi(t) as a function of
vi(t− T ) and v˜i−1(t− T ) as follows:
vi(t) = λT v˜i−1(t− T ) + (1− λT )vi(t− T ) (15)
and thus we will have:
vi(t+ T ) = λT v˜i−1(t)
+ (1− λT )
(
λT v˜i−1(t− T ) + (1− λT )vi(t− T )
)
(16)
By continuing this process for the past steps, we can establish
the following relationship between AV i’s future speed, its
initial speed, and AV i− 1’s past speed values:
vi(nT ) = (1− λT )n−1vi(0)
+
n∑
l=0
λT (1− λT )lv˜i−1 ((n− l)T ) . (17)
(17) shows that AV i− 1’s older speed values have smaller
effect on AV i’s speed decision. Moreover, for large values
of n, the term (1 − λT )n−1 tends to zero. Thus, we can
approximate (17) as follows:
vi(nT ) =
n¯∑
l=0
λT (1− λT )lv˜i−1 ((n− l)T ) , (18)
where n¯ is the smallest integer number which satisfies n¯ ≤
log()
log(|1−λT |) , where  is a small value that can be defined
based on the maximum allowable speed of an AV on the
road. (18) shows the dependence of vi on the past values
of vi−1. Now, using (7) we can find also the relationship
between AV i’s speed and its own past actions as well as
those of the attacker, as follows:
vi(n) =
n¯∑
l=0
λT (1− λT )lvi−1 (n− l) +
n¯∑
l=0
λT (1− λT )l
× (wTi (n− l)ei(n− l) +wTi (n− l)ai(n− l)).
(19)
Thus, at each time step, only the n¯ past actions of the attacker
and AV i will affect AV i’s future speed if λT < 2. Note
that, in (19), we dropped T from the arguments of all the
time variant functions for notational simplicity. 
Theorem 1 proves that in order to solve the optimization
problems in (9) and (11), the AV and the attacker can
only use their past nˆ actions. Next, we derive the initial
spacing between AVs when AV i for the first time must start
following i−1 to converge to an optimal safe spacing, which
will be useful in the solution of our problem.
Proposition 1. The spacing between AVs i and i − 1
converges to an optimal safe spacing if AV i− 1 must start
following AV i− 1 when the spacing is:
d∗(ν)=o(ν)− (nˆ+ 2)Tν + Tν
nˆ−1∑
p=0
(1− (1− λT )p) ,
(20)
where d∗(ν) is the spacing when the AV i starts following
AV i, and ν is the expectation of vi−1, E{vi−1} = ν.
Proof. From (8), we can find the following:
di(n+ 1) = di(n) + T (vi−1(n+ 1)− vi(n+ 1))
= di(n) + Tvi−1(n+ 1)
−
n¯∑
l=0
λT 2(1− λT )lv˜i−1 (n− l + 1) . (21)
Let the estimation v˜ be noise-free and attack-free. Then, we
can find di as a function of its initial state and only AV i’s
speed as follows:
di(n+ 1) = di(0) +
n∑
p=0
Tvi−1(p+ 1)
−
n∑
p=0
min{n¯,p}∑
l=0
λT 2(1− λT )lvi−1 (p− l + 1) ,
(22)
Then, the expectation of the spacing will be:
E{di(n+ 1)} = di(0) + nTν − ν
n∑
p=0
min{n¯,p}∑
l=0
λT 2(1− λT )l
= di(0) + nTν
− ν
n∑
p=0
λT 2
1− (1− λT )min{n¯,p}
1− (1− λT )
= di(0) + nTν − Tν
nˆ−1∑
p=0
(1− (1− λT )p)
− Tν
n∑
p=nˆ
(1− (1− λT )p)
= di(0) + nTν − (n− (nˆ− 1) + 1)Tν
− Tν
nˆ−1∑
p=0
(1− (1− λT )p)
= di(0)+(nˆ+ 2)Tν−Tν
nˆ−1∑
p=0
(1− (1− λT )p) .
Given that our goal is to reach an optimal safe spacing, we
have E{di(n+1)} = o(ν), and, then, we can derive (20). 
Proposition 1 shows that AV i must start following AV
i − 1 when it reaches a distance of d∗(ν) from AV i − 1
while AV i− 1’s speed is ν. Now, if di(0) = d∗i (ν), we can
formally define the regret function of (9) as follows:
Ri(n)=λ
2T 4
[ n∑
p=0
min{n¯,p}∑
l=0
(1− λT )l
(
wTi (p− l + 1)ei(p− l + 1)
+wTi (p− l + 1)ai(p− l + 1)
)]2
, (23)
where for notational simplicity we use Ri(n) instead of
Ri(ai(n),wi(n), ei(n)) as defined in (9). We can see that,
at each time step n, the regret function accumulates the
errors from the initial time step till n. Thus, if we define
the deviation from optimal safe spacing at time step n as
follows:
δi(n) ,
n∑
p=0
min{n¯,p}∑
l=0
(1− λT )l
(
wTi (p− l + 1)ei(p− l + 1)
+wTi (p− l + 1)ai(p− l + 1)
)
, (24)
then, we can derive the deviation as a process as follows:
δi(n)=δi(n− 1)+
min{n¯,n}∑
l=0
(1− λT )l
(
wTi (min{n¯, n} −l+ 1)ei(min{n¯, n} −l+ 1) +wTi (min{n¯, n} −l+ 1)ai(min{n¯, n} −l+ 1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ(wi,ai,ei)
.
(25)
Thus, we can write the regret function as follows:
Ri(n) = λ
2T 4
[
δi(n− 1) + θ (wi(n),ai(n), ei(n))
]2
.
(26)
Then, at each time step n, the attacker and the AV must
choose their associated vectors using their past nˆ actions
and the deviation from last step, δi(n− 1).
We now formally define a noncooperative game where the
players are the attacker and the AV, the AV’s action αAV(n) is
to choose a weighting vector at each time step, wi(n), and
the attacker’s action, αatt(n) is to choose a data injection
vector at each time step, ai(n). Moreover, the AV’s utility
function is UAV(n) = −Ri(n) while the attacker’s utility
function is U att = Ri(n). A suitable solution concept for
the defined game is the so-called Nash equilibrium (NE)
which a stable game state at which the AV cannot reduce
the regret by unilaterally changing its action wi(n) given
that the action of the attacker is fixed. Moreover, at the
NE, the attacker cannot increase the regret by changing its
action ai(n) while the AV keeps its action fixed. Since the
players utility at each time step sum up to zero, the game
is zero-sum and is guaranteed to admit at least one mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) [20]. A mixed strategy
is a randomization between the available actions of the AV
which satisfy
∑n
i=1 w
k
i = 1 and the available actions of
the attacker which satisfy |aki | < τk, ∀k = 1, . . . , 4. Even
though the MSNE exists for our game, it is analytically
challenging to derive the equilibrium strategies. Thus, we
next propose a deep RL algorithm for this game in which
the AV and the attacker learn their optimal actions based on
their time-varying observations of each others’ actions.
IV. ADVERSARIAL DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
FOR OPTIMAL SAFE AV CONTROL
The proposed deep RL algorithm have two components:
(i) A DNN that summarizes the past actions and spacing
deviations and (ii) an RL component, which can be used by
each player to decide on the best action to choose based on
the summary from the DNN, as shown in Fig. 1.
To derive the AV and the attacker’s actions that maximize
their expected utility using RL, we use a Q-learning algo-
rithm [21]. In this algorithm, we define a state-action value
Q-function Qj(sj , αj) which is the expected return of player
j when starting at a state sj and performing action αj . To
derive the maximizer action at each time step for each player,
we use the following update rule for the Q function [21]:
Qjn+1(s
j(n), αj(n))=
Qjn(s
j(n), αj(n)) + β
[
U j(n+ 1)+
γmax
αj
Qjn+1(s
j(n+ 1),αj)−Qjn(sj(n), αj(n))
]
, (27)
where β is the learning rate and γ is the discount factor.
In our problem, αatt = ai(n) is the attacker’s action while,
αAV = wi(n) is the AV’s action. Moreover, since the players
have no information about the other player’s past actions
and noise vector, the observed state for the AV is sAV(n) =
{wi(n− nˆ),. . .,wi(n− 1);δi(n− nˆ),. . .,δi(n− 1)} while
the observed state for the attacker is satt(n) =
{ai(n− nˆ), . . . ,ai(n− 1); δi(n− nˆ), . . . , δi(n− 1)}.
From (27), we can see that at each step, the players must
find the action which maximizes Qjn. However, to be able
to find such action, each player must know all the possible
states, and at each time step find the maximizer action
over the observed action. However, in our problem, all the
available states cannot be stored since, wi(n), ai(n), ei(n),
and δi(n) have continuous values which will result in an
infinite state space.
To solve such a challenging problem, we use DNNs which
are very effective at extracting features from large data sets.
Particularly, we use long short term memory (LSTM) blocks
which are deep recurrent neural networks (RNNs) that can
store information for long periods of time and, thus, can
learn long-term dependencies within a given sequence [22]–
[24]. Essentially, an LSTM algorithm processes an input
sequence sj(n) by adding new information into a memory,
and using gates which control the extent to which new
information should be memorized, old information should be
forgotten, and current information should be used. Therefore,
the output of an LSTM algorithm will be impacted by the
network activation in previous time steps. Thus, LSTMs are
suitable for our problem in which we want to extract useful
features from actions and deviation of previous time steps
and reduce our state space. Thus, the proposed deep RL
algorithm will use a DNN as shown in Fig. 1 to approximate
the Q function for each player and using this Q-function
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AV
𝑄 function 
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Connected 
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Fig. 1: The architecture for the proposed adversarial deep RL algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Deep RL for Robust AV Control
1: Initialize two replay memory Mj that stores the past experiences of
the players and two DNNs for Qj .
2: Observe initial state sj(0) for both players.
3: Repeat:
4: Select an action αj for each player j:
5: with probability ε select a random action,
6: otherwise select αj = argmaxα′j Q
j(sj(n), α′j).
7: Perform action αj for both players simultaneously.
8: Observe utility Uj(n+ 1) and new state sj(n+ 1).
9: Store experience
{
sj(n), αj(n), Uj(n+ 1), sj(n+ 1)
}
in replay
memory Dj for each player j.
10: Sample a random experience
{ˆ
sj(η),αˆj(η),Uˆj(η + 1),sˆj(η + 1)
}
from the replay memory Dj for each player.
11: Calculate the target value tj for each player j:
12: If the sampled experience is for n = 0 then tj = Uˆj ,
13: Otherwise tj = Uˆj + γmaxα′j Q
j(sˆj(n+ 1), α′j).
14: Train the network Qj for each player using:
[tj −Qj(sˆj(n), aˆj(n))]2.
15: n = n+ 1.
16: Until convergence to an MSNE
we will choose optimal actions for each player from (27).
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed adversarial deep RL
approach that is used by each player to learn its optimal
action vectors. Moreover, Fig. 1 shows the DNN architecture
for the proposed adversarial deep RL algorithm. Using the
proposed algorithm, we can find the optimal actions for the
players and it will converge to one of the MSNE points of
the game [21].
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we choose a reaction parameter λ = 1
and a sampling period T = 1. Using Theorem 1, by choosing
 = 0.001 we find nˆ = 66 which is equivalent to 6.6 seconds.
This means that each AV only needs the information about
the past 6.6 seconds to be able to carry out an optimal safe
action. Moreover, we consider that the sensor noise powers
are arranged in a descending order as follows: RSS, radar,
camera and beacon. This is due to the fact that the RSS
might have the highest error for speed measurement while the
beacon is sending the exact speed information from AV i−1
to AV i. In addition, we do not supply the information about
noise statistics to the AV and the attacker. Thus, they both
must learn such information during the interaction with each
other. Moreover, we consider that the attack threshold levels
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Fig. 2: The AV and the attacker’s action, regret, and
deviation for our proposed algorithm in the case where the
attacker attacks only to the beacon information.
for the sensors are τ1 = 0.5 m/s , τ1 = 1 m/s , tau3 = 1
m/s, and τ1 = 1.5 m/s.
In our first simulation, we consider a case in which the
attacker can only attack beacon values as it is one of the
most studied attacks in the literature. Also, since the beacon
has the lowest error power, the ideal case for the AV is to
put the highest weight on beacon information in the absence
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Fig. 3: The AV and the attacker’s action, regret, and
deviation for our proposed algorithm in the case where the
attacker attacks all the sensors.
of the attacker. Fig. 2 shows the action vector for the AV
and the attacker when they interact for the first 100 seconds
during which AV i follows i − 1. From Fig. 2 we can see
that, even though the beacon has the lowest error power,
since the attacker attacks the beacons, the AV decides to put
more weight on other sensors. Moreover, Fig. 2 shows that,
although the attacker can always have a data injection that is
equal to the threshold level, τ3 = 1, it can sometimes decide
to inject lower values, to maximize the expected deviation. In
addition, Fig. 2 shows that, in the first steps of the learning
procedure, the attacker can inject deviations in the spacing
thus increasing the regret for the AV. However, our proposed
deep RL algorithm enables the AV to mitigate the error on
the estimation and thus stay robust to the data injected attack.
Therefore, after 100 seconds, we see that the regret reduces
to zero and the attacker cannot force the AV to deviate from
its optimal safe spacing.
Next, in another simulation, we consider the worst case
security scenario, where the attacker can attack all of the
sensor readings. Fig. 3 shows the AV and the attacker action
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the proposed deep RL algorithm
with a baseline that does not use any learning process.
process during the first 100 seconds of car-following. In this
case, we can see from Fig. 3 that the attacker can attack
to all the sensor values and thus, the AV cannot prioritize
between the sensor readings as in the previous simulation.
Thus, Fig. 3 shows that the AV tries to assign higher weights
to one step in small time periods to deceive the attacker. In
contrast, the attacker tries to maximize the value of injected
data as seen from Fig. 3 that the injected data values are
close to the threshold level. Moreover, Fig. 3 shows that
in the first 10 seconds the value of regret has an abrupt
increase, while in the remaining time the regret stays almost
constant. Also, the spacing deviation reaches a value close to
10 meter. This means that, when the attacker can attack all of
the sensor values, the AV cannot make the estimation robust
to the injected attack, however the regret stays approximately
constant. Thus, the AV can feedback the spacing deviation δ
to its car following model to compensate the deviation from
the optimal safe spacing by changing the speed and thus
make the AV resilient to such data injection attacks.
In Fig. 4 we show the spacing deviation as a function
of time. In this figure, we compare our proposed deep RL
algorithm with a baseline scenario, where the AV knows the
noise distributions and choose a static weighting vector wi
using a Kalman filter. Fig. 4 shows that, even though the
used Kalman filter converges to a constant spacing deviation,
however, our proposed deep RL algorithm has a lower steady
state deviation than the Kalman filter. This is due to the
fact that the Kalman filter only takes into account the noise
power, however, our proposed algorithm uses an adversarial
approach to learn the attacker’s action. This, indeed, enables
the AV to minimize the deviation from the optimal safe
spacing and remain more robust to the attacker.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel deep RL method
which enables a robust dynamics control for AVs in presence
of data injection attacks on their sensor readings. To analyze
the incentives of attacker to attack on the AV data and address
the AV’s reaction to such attacks, we have formulated a
game-theoretic problem between the attacker and the AV.
We have shown that, deriving the mixed strategies at Nash
equilibrium is analytically challenging. Thus, we have used
our proposed deep RL algorithm to learn the optimal sensor
fusion for the AV at each time step that results in minimizing
the deviation from an optimal safe inter-vehicle spacing. In
the proposed deep RL algorithm, we have used LSTM blocks
which can extract temporal features and dependence of AV
and attacker actions and deviation values and feed them to a
reinforcement learning algorithm. Simulation results show
that, using the proposed deep RL algorithm, an AV can
mitigate the effect of data injection attacks on the sensor
data and thus stay robust to such attacks.
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